In my Ph.D. dissertation, Erasing the Differences: Expressivism and Normative Realism, I argue that expressivism about normative discourse is compatible with realism about normativity, and that this brings important benefits for realism, in particular a new way of addressing certain epistemological challenges. I was advised by Hartry Field (committee chair), Sharon Street, and Tom Nagel.
Other topics in metaethics that I'm interested in include:
- the nature of normative disagreement;
- the relevance of evolution, psychology, and neuroscience to moral epistemology;
- the prospects for meta-semantic versions of expressivism.
Ethics and moral psychology
I'm interested in the interplay between various conceptions of personal identity and our ethical judgments and attitudes, particularly retrospective attitudes like regret and affirmation. I also have an interest in the grounds and norms of love.
Expressivism and the reliability challenge, forthcoming in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Expressivism and realist explanations, Philosophical Studies, 2017
Robert N. Johnson and Michael Smith (eds.), Passions and Projections. Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn, Oxford University Press. Forthcoming in Journal of Moral Philosophy.
Work in progress (titles missing to assist with anonymous review)
- A paper on the rationality of regret
- A paper on Thomas Reid
- A paper on disagreement in attitude and moral objectivity
- A paper on expressivism and evolutionary debunking arguments
- A paper on love and identity